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Abstract 
Narcotics ruins peoples' lives in the United States everyday. The 
United States government not only imposes stiff sentences on drug 
dealers but also spends billions of dollars a year developing programs to 
try to reduce the high intensity of drug distribution in cities across the 
United States. Unfortunately there is still a high number of narcotics 
being distributed within the United States. We use a stochastic model 
to study the trends of drug dealer populations set into motion as a 
result of fixing a set of incarceration times for drug dealers. We then 
project these trends and calculate costs associated with jailing drug 
dealers and the associated active drug dealer distributions. 
Specific questions that we are address include: Do a fixed set of 
incarceration times set trends in drug dealer populations? For a fixed 
set of incarceration times, how much does it cost to jail drug dealers 
5 years? For 10 years? What do these costs buy? Are there less drug 
dealers as a result of these policies? 
Introduction: 
National Facts 
The use and distribution of illicit drugs is one of the biggest and most 
expensive problems the United States government faces today. In 1995, the 
US government spent a total of$ 29.7 billion dollars in the war against drug 
manufacturing and distribution (Drug Policy Foundation). From 1985 to 
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1997, the total budget spent to fund programs against drug manufacturing 
and distribution increased by more than 50% (web.NIDA). The increase is 
due to many factors, one such being criminal activity. 
Drug manufacturing and distribution is a problem that is getting worse 
due to the direct relationship between drugs and crime. Although this 
relationship is not completely understood, recent statistical studies have 
shown that this relationship can be summarized in three points: Drug users 
report greater involvement in crime and are more likely than nonusers to 
have criminal records; persons with criminal records are much more likely 
than those without criminal records to report being drug users; lastly, since 
drug dealers use violence as a method to protect, expand their drug market, 
reduce competition, and to intimidate the police officials. Crime rises as 
drug use and distribution rises. 
The problem is acute in urban areas. In a sample of 415 homicides in 
New York City during 1989, 53% were drug related (U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
In a public study made during 1989, 58% of people believed that drugs were 
the main factors responsible for crime ( U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
Even though drug use and distribution have been mentioned as one of 
the most important problems facing the nation today, little has been done 
to try to control this epidemic. 
California: Drugs and Incarceration Issue 
The state of California is one of the areas with the highest rates of 
drug use and distribution. A 1991 FBI report showed that California has 
a proportion of drugs related arrest of 500+ per 100,000 population (U. S. 
Dept. of Justice). The prison population for the 1997-year was 163,695. 
About 65% of all the inmates in California are committed to prison from 
Southern California, with about 36% from Los Angeles County, 8% from 
San Diego County, and 15% from the San Francisco Bay area (CA Dept. of 
Corrections). The California State Department of Corrections (CDC) thinks 
that it will have 232,386 inmates in the year 2001. The proposed 1996-1997 
CDC budget was about 3.8 billion dollars, which was a 11% (360 million 
dollar) increase from the previous year (CA Dept. of Corrections). 
California enforces a "Three Strikes and You're Out" policy. The pur-
pose of "Three Strikes" is to put repeating felons behind bars for a longtime. 
Specifically, "threepeaters" for a minimum of 25 years after their third ar-
rest. If an individual commits a total of three offenses, the individual would 
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be put in jail for a minumum of twenty-five years. CDC's forecast assumes 
that the "Three Strikes and You're Out" law enacted in 1994 will continue to 
have a great impact in increasing the prison population. During the 1996-97 
one of every eight offenders (9,628) sent to prison under the "Three Strikes" 
law was a third time offender (CA Dept. of Corrections). The CDC ex-
pect 13,100 "Three Strikes" admissions annually by 2000-2001, this implies 
a increase of millions of dollars to the budget. 
MODEL 
To help simplify the analysis of the problem, we apply the "Three Strikes 
and You're Out" policy enforced in California in a simple stochastic model. 
In our system we consider only drugs dealers who move from society to 
jail back to society until their third arrest. Our purpose is to estimate the 
minimum incarceration time for first and second time offenders. We want 
the minimum time, because if we now this information we then can project 
these trends and calculate costs associated with jailing drug dealers and the 
associated active drug dealer distributions. 
Definitions: 
Dealer: Any individual that distributes any type of narcotics. 
Drug Offence: A misdemeanor or felony for distributing drugs resulting 
in incarceration. 
Fresh Dealer: A drug dealer that has never been arrested. 
First Time Offender: A drug dealer in jail that has been arrested 
only once. 
Once-Released Offender: A drug dealer who has been incarcerated 
once and has been released. Once-released offenders continue to deal drugs. 
Second Time Offender: A drug dealer in jail that has been arrested 
exactly twice. 
Twice-Released Offender: A drug dealer who has been incarcerated 
twice and has been released twice. Twice-released offenders continue to 
deal drugs. 
Third Time Offender: A drug dealer in jail that has been arrested 
exactly thrice. 
Thrice-Released Offender: A drug dealer who has been incarcerated 
three and has been released three times. Thrice-released offenders do not 
continue to deal drugs. 
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Model: 
-~ -~ -~ 
where x = e ~'o ,y =e ~'I , and z =e ~'2 
Assumptions: 
• After the individual is released from jail for the third time, the indi-
vidual leaves the system completely, i.e. does not deal drugs anymore. 
• After every arrest, the average time for a drug dealer to get arrested 
increases due to experience. Average time before a drug dealer gets arrested 
for the: 
first time is between 0-1 year 
second time is between 1-2 years 
third time is between 2-5 years 
• After a dealer is arrested and subsequently released from jail, he/she 
continues to distribute drugs. 
• When a dealer is in jail, he/she cannot deal drugs. So we do not 
consider him/her a threat to society. 
• The number of arrests a law official makes is not affected by the number 
of dealers in jail. 
• Dealers can only be arrested for dealing drugs. 
• Jails are big enough to fit all the arrested dealers. So we are not 
concerned with lack of jail space. 
• The inflow of new dealers into our system depends only on the the 
average first incarceration time. 
• The rates at which dealers are arrested ares decreasing functions of the 
average incarceration times. 
Parameters: 
No is the number of fresh dealers. 
N1 is the number of once-released offenders. 
N2 is the number of twice-released offenders. 
J 1 is the number of first time offenders. 
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h is the number of second time offenders. 
h is the number of twice time offenders. 
A=10 Ao is the inflow of dealers, i.e. people starting careers in dealing 
drugs. 
11 is the average time before a fresh dealer gets arrested for dealing 
drugs . 
...!. is the average time in jail for a first time offender. 
'YO 12 is the average time before a once-released offender gets arrested again 
for dealing drugs . 
...!. is the average time in jail for a second time offender. 
/'1 13 is the average time before a twice-released offender gets arrested again 
for dealing drugs . 
...!. is the average time in jail for a third time offender. 
/'2 
Equations: 
Estimating Parameters: 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Estimating our parameters was one of the many problems we faced in 
developing our model. The problem we with the parameters in our model 
was that we could not get access to some actual data. For example the 
average time spend before a drug dealer get's arrested for the ith time, i 
for i = 1, 2, 3, is one of parameter that we had to estimate, since we could 
not find this information in any statistical reference. 
We talked with a couple police officers from Los Angeles county to help 
us set i. Both officers were in their respective narcotics divisions and for 
their safety and the safety of their families did not give their names. Each 
one independently suggested the parameter ranges. Specifically o::; 11 ::; 1 
years, 1::; 12 ::; 2 years, and 2::; 13 ::; 5 years. 
The next parameters to estimate was intial population for drug dealers 
in jail for their first, second, and third time. We assumed, for simplicity of 
our model, at time equal to zero the initial drug dealers in jail for the first, 
second, and third time were all equal to 100 dealers, Jo = J1 = Js = 100. 
Also it is assumed that at time equal to zero, the initial number of drug 
dealers that have been arrested for the first, second, and third time are all 
equal to 200 dealers, No = N1 = N2 = 200. 
The next parameter to estimate was the number of new drug dealers 
per unit of time, 1oAo, at time equal to zero.To ensure that for plausable 
incarceration times we get a number of fresh dealers, A, that is realistic in 
comparison to the initial population sizes we set Ao equal to 650 dealers. 
In modeling the number of new drug dealers coming into our system, A, 
we consider the fact that if a drug dealer is put in jail for a long time for 
the first offence, this would discourage new drug dealers from coming into 
the system. And vice-versa, if a drug dealer is put in jail for a short period 
of time, this would encourage more people to deal drugs and therfore come 
into the sytem. So we let A be a function satisfying the above mentioned 
conditions. 
We fix the average time in jail for a third time drug offender, ~ 2 ,to 
be equal to 25 years because of the "Three Strikes" law. The purpose of 
"Three Strikes" is to put repeating felons behind bars for a long time, i.e. 
for a minimum of 25 years after their third arrest. 
We have only have ai left to estimate, since we plan to vary the average 
incarceration times, .!. , 1 . For simplicity's sake we let a 1 = a2 = a3. 
'Yo 'Yl 
We noticed after varing ai from 0.1, 1x10-5 , 1x1o-6 , and 1xl0-11 that the 
distributions were uninteresting for some cases ( ai = 0.1) and relatively the 
same for other choices of ai. 
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For ai =0.1 our jail populations tend to zero after a short period of time, 
roughly 5 years. See Figure 1.1 and 1.2. 
Note: All simulations were run ten times and for thirty years. 
<ll,;liVtl UIU!j Utl<lfi:Hli <1\;UVtl UIUIJ UtlCiftlfli 
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Figura 1.1 Figura 1.2 
Figure 1.1 (! , ! ) = (5,5) and Figure 1.2 ( ..!..., ! ) = (0.5,10) almost all pop-
,o ,1 /o ,1 
ulations go to zero especially the jail populations for ai =0.1. In both figures only 
a few dealer populations survive. 
For ai = 1x1o-5 (Figure 1.3) ,1x1o-6 (Figure 1.4), and 1x1o-u (Figure 
1.5) we get similar resulting distributions. 
Distribution of Average Drug Dealer Population Distribution of Average Drug Dealer Population 
0.5 0.5 ,-----.--.----..-.-----.-~----, 
0.4 0.4 
0.3 0.3 
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0 0 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
Figura 1.3 Figura 1.4 
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Distribution of Average Drug Dealer Population 
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Figure 1.3 for ( ..l.., ..l.. )=(0.5,15), Figure 1.4 for ( ..l.., ..l..) = (0.5, 15) and Figure 
~0 ~1 ~0 ~1 
1.5 for ( ..l.., ..l..) = (0.5, 20) show the resulting populations to be very similar. The 
~0 ~1 
numbers correspond as 1 = No,2 = J1,3 = NI,4 = J2,5 = N2,6 =h. 
Since we are looking for interesting trends in the populations we dis-
regard ai=O.l and arbitrarily choose ai = lxlo-5 instead of lxlo-6 or 
lxl0- 11 . 
Deterministic Analysis: 
The deterministic approach gives us an explicit solution to the problem, 
but the results of a stochastic model adds the realistic property of chance 
to the dynamics. 
-Al 0 0 0 0 0 
Al -Ale 
-~ 
"l'O 0 0 0 0 
-~ 0 A1e "l'O -A2 0 0 0 
If A= -~ and 0 0 A2 -A2e 1'1 0 0 
0 0 0 A2e -~ 1'1 -A3 0 
0 0 0 0 A3 -A3e -~ -.,2 
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•, 
~~ ~ 
0 Jl 
0 N1 
, then x'(t) =Ax+ B with x= 0 h B= and the solution 
0 ~ 
0 J3 
is x(t) = (X0-A -l B)e-At_A -l B where Xo is an initial population dis-
tribution and where A -l exists since A is an upper diagonal matrix with 
diagonal elements different from zero. Since A is upper diagonal matrix then 
the diagonal elements are the eigenvalues. Notice that all the eigenvalues 
are negative, so lim x(t) =-A-lB. 
t-+oo 
We now compute A-1B. 
_ _L 0 
A,J. 
-~ 
e "YO 
--xl 
1 
-A& 
-~ 
e "Yl 
---x;---
1 
-\1 -~ 
e "Y2 
---x;-
_Ao"(o 
A1 -~ 
Ao7oe "YO 
Al 
_Ao70 
A2 -~ Ao7oe "Yl 
>.2 
_Ao7o 
A3-~ 
Ao1oe "Y2 
>.3 
-~ 
e "YO 
--xl 
1 
-A& 
-~ 
e "Yl 
---x;---
1 
-\1 
-~ 
e "Y2 
---x;-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-~ 
e "Y2 
---x;-
For the above choices of parameters and c;o, ~1 ) = (0.5, 10) 
2600 
2600 
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1950 
4550 
4550 
Ao/o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
The next figures show (left) the average distribution for drug dealers and 
(right) the limiting deterministic distribution for drug dealers. 
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Distribution of Average Drug Dealer Populatio 
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And now for the above choices of parameters and ( .l, 1...) = (5, 10) 
/o /1 
lim x ( t) = -A-lB = 
t-+oo 
65 
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The next figures show (left) the average distribution for drug dealers and 
(right) the limiting deterministic distribution for drug dealers. 
Distribution of Al.l9rage Drug Dealer Population 
0.35.-~~-~~~-
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 
10 
'• 
As you can see the distributions from the deterministic results have little 
variation, in fact they come in pairs (No,JI), (N1,J2) and (Nz,J3). And 
although our simulations do not seem to be limiting to the deterministic 
distributions, we cannot rule out the possibility that they do not. The two 
may not match because the deterministic distribution may limit after a time 
that may be unrealistic. 
Methodology 
We are interested in finding out what trends result when public policy 
dictates incarceration times in a city that enforces the "three strikes and 
you're out" policy. As we would like to predict future criminal trends and 
their resulting jail costs. 
Our first step in this process is to fix the set of incarceration times, ( _L, 
'Yo 
_L ). Next we wanted to simulate the solutions to Equations 1-6 with a 
')'1 
stochastic simulation model. 
So we must now examine the possible events. 
Event 1: A person moves into the fresh dealer population, No ::::}No+1 
at the rate A. 
Event 2: A person is removed from the fresh dealer population and added 
~ 
to the first time offender, (No,JI)*(No-1,JI+1), at the rate >.. 1N0e-"~o. 
Event 3: A person is removed from the first time offender population 
and added to the once-released population, (JI,NI)*(JI-1,N1+1), at the 
rate [ 0 J1. 
Event 4: A person is removed from the once-released offender population 
and added to the second time offender, (NbJz)*(N1-1,Jz+1), at the rate 
-~ A.zNie "~1 . 
Event 5: A person is removed from the second time offender population 
and added to the twice-released population, (J2,Nz)*(Jz-1,Nz+1), at the 
rate /Ilz· 
Event 6: A person is removed from the twice-released offender population 
and added to the third time offender, (N2,J3)*(Nz-1,J3+1), at the rate 
-~ 
>..3N2e "~2. 
Event 7: A person is removed from the third time offender population, 
J3 ::::}J3-1, at a rate /2h· 
Now we suppose that for each event the time between occurances is 
exponentially distributed. We discretiz time into days, a small increment 
11 
of time when one considers that the dynamics at which we will be looking 
occur over tens of years. Also we assumed that the events are independent 
of each other. This is plausible, i.e. a prisoner being released from jail does 
not, as a single event in a day, affect whether or not Johnny Hood becomes 
a drug dealer. So at the end of each day each one of these events has had the 
probability 1-eP(rate of event i) of occuring. This means that any combination 
of any number of events 1-7 to all seven events can happen in a day. When 
the computer uses a random number generator to decide what happens, this 
algorithm decides the dynamics of the system stochastically. 
Using the above algorithm we ran the ten simulations for thirty years for 
each of 25 ordered pairs ( .1.., .1..). Then we averaged over the simulations to 
TO /1 
arrive at a set of "average" solution curves No(t), J1(t), N1(t), J2(t), N2(t) 
and J3(t). From this set we calculated the above distributions and did the 
following projection in time. 
Using the plots of the solutions we estimated at what point in time, t8 , 
it would be appropriate to approximate future solutions by a line, assuming 
that the trends set in thirty years could be relied upon for up to about ten 
years. For all but the calculation for (~o, ~~) = (5,20) we used t 8 =10,000 
days. The data from this point used in time until the end of the simulation, 
t3o, we found the least squares best-fit line to the set of "average" solutions 
for tE[ts,t3o]. With the best fit line we can now project future populations 
reliably for about ten years. We are also in a position to answer our question 
about future costs and their purchasing power as far as the incarceration 
times' impact on the active dealer population. 
To estimate the total cost of jailing dealers for a fixed amount of time, 
tp in days, after t 30 we must estimate the cost of jailing the ith time offender 
population for tp days, fori= 1, 2 and 3. Summing over i would give us the 
total jail cost for tp days after t30. To estimate the jail cost for the ith time 
offender we must take the number of incarcerated dealers at time tE[t30 ,t30 
+ tp], Ji(t) = mit + bi, where mi and bi are the best fit line coefficients 
obtained earlier for the ith time offender populationand multiply it by the 
daily per inmate incarceration cost, c. Then cJ i ( t) is the cost for jailing the 
ith time offender population for day t. Summing over tE[t3o,t3o + tp]we get 
the cost of jailing the ith time offender population for tp days. So if Ci(tp,c) 
is the cost of jailing the ith time offender population for tp days, then 
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t3o+tp t3o+tp 
Ci(tp,c) = I: cJi(t)=c I: mit+bi 
t=t3o t=t3o 
( t3o+tp t3o+tp) =C mi I: t+b I: 
t=t3o t=t3o 
=Cmi ( (t3o+tp)(~3o+tp+l) (t3o-lJ(t3o)) +cb( t3o+tp-t3o+ 1) 
=T ( ( t3o+tp) ( t3o+tp+ 1 )-( t3o-1) (t3o)) +cb( tp+ 1) 
So then if T(tp,c) is the total cost of jailing dealers for tp days after t 30 
then 
3 3 
T(tp,c) = L::Ci(tp,c) = I: (T((t3o + tp)(t3o + tp + 1)- (t3o- 1)(t3o)) + cb(tp + 1)) 
i=l i=l 
=~c(m1 +m2+m3)((t3o + tp)(t3o + tp+1)-(t3o-1)(t3o))+3cb( tp + 1) 
Now if we wish to know how much the active dealer population changes 
over the tp days after t3o we can look at the percent change between the 
total active dealer population at time t3o, 
2 
old= ~Nj(t3o) 
j=O 
and the total active dealer population at time t3o + tp, 
2 
new= ~Nj(t3o + tp)· 
j=O 
Then the percent change is of course 
new-old 
%6. = old x 100%. 
RESULTS and CONCLUSIONS 
We performed the above calculations using an annual per inmate cost 
of $21,000 (CDC web) and projections of tp = 5 years and 10 years for 
the set (.;>.;1 )E[0.5,5,10,15,20] x [0.5,5,10,15,20] = r. This means that c 
=21,000/365.25 ($/day) and tp = 5(365.25) and 10(365.25). The following 
pages contain the results. 
You may notice at first that for(! ,..!.. )=(0.5,0.5-20) we get T(tp,c) much 
10 1'1 
higher than any other group of incarceration times. One can immediately 
point to the amounts of money being spent in J3. This is a result of a low 
first time incarceration that results in the inflow of a large number of fresh 
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dealers that must go through the system. With the long period of time 
in which a dealer can expect to stay in jail for his/her third time, inmates 
begin to accumulate and this accounts for the large amounts of money being 
spent on third time time offenders, h. Now as the second incarceration time 
increases the amount of money spent on second time offenders also increases, 
and one notices that the most money is spent on J 2 when ~1 = 20 years. This 
results in (0.5,20) having the highest T(tp,c). Notice that for all this money 
being spent (the highest throughout r!) the percent changes in this group 
do not compete with other points in r. Also notice that the projection for 
ten years just pronounces any differences in the data. We can conclude that 
there does not exist a direct relationship between money spent incarcerating 
dealers and a resultant drop in active dealer population. 
Next notice that for the lowest amount of money, $158.2 million, spent 
one gets one of the lowest positive percent change in active dealers. This 
remains true for the ten year projection. Although we do not get a drop 
in active dealer population we do get a smaller increase than if we had 
incarerated under a more expensive policy. Again we can conclude that 
there does not exist a direct relationship between money spent incarcerating 
dealers and a resultant drop in active dealer population. 
We then notice an interesting fact, there is a set 0, 
1 1 1 1 0 = { (-, -) E r : - + - = c,ca constant. 
lo /1 /o /1 
For our finite r we must get that 0 is finite. Then it is easily verified 
that one will spend the least amount of money when ..l.. is the largest value 
/o 
with ( ..l.., ..l..) still in n. This could be helpful for policy makers who would 
/o /1 
like to claim that they put criminals away for no shorter than c years while 
maintaining a jail budget under some amount of money. 
One may also notice that there are points in r that yield negative percent 
changes corresponding to drops in active dealers. The biggest of such drops 
occurs for ( ..l..,~ ) = (20,15), %~=-8.13% for the 5 year projection and 
%b.=-15.966% f~r the 10 year projection. Although this may seem great, 
you should then notice that incarcerating a first time offender for twenty 
years is really harsh and may be considered cruel and unusual punishment. 
This policy is not likely to be adopted by any municipality in Los Angeles 
county much less any part of the United States. 
One of the most promising results may be the existence of such a point as 
1* =(10,0.5). This point exhibits some desirable qualities. It has a negative 
percent change, which means that it has a positive effect for society. Another 
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key quality is its frugality. For both the five and ten year projection the 
T(tp,c) ranks 12th lowest in cost. The existence of such a point gives hope 
that there may be more such points, maybe within close proximity. 
After some investigations with this model we have seen some dynamics 
that are not intuitive. This should lead one to believe that the problem of 
incarcerating dealers is not as clear cut as one might think at first. With 
improvements to our model and some more investigations we may find a 
solution to the problem of drug dealing in our nation. 
Improvements: 
Our recomendations for future works on the stocastics models of Drugs 
Distribution is the consideration of the (or some of them) following: 
• Criminals Rates : having under consideration that a drug dealer can 
be put in jail, by the commitment of another type of crime diferent from 
drug violation. 
• Populations Interactions : divide the total population in non drugs 
users, drug users, and drugs dealers. Establish the relation between them, 
and study the dynamics. 
• Jail Capacity : In reality the jails system support a finite number of 
criminals. 
• Drug use and distribution depend on the space area and population 
density. 
• In our model, add a chance that a criminal does not go back to dealing 
drugs after they are released the first time and afther they are released the 
second time 
• Perform the above simulations and calculations for postive integer less 
than 20 that we omitted to find other points such as 'Y*. 
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